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Fiscal decentralisation and autonomy
Vince Mangioni
Introduction
Fiscal autonomy is defined by Hooghe et al. (2016, p. 6) as ‘the extent to which a regional 
government can independently tax its population.’ Mangioni (2016) defines the objective 
of fiscal autonomy as the impost and collection of revenue for the benefit of the commu-
nity revenue is collected from. While fiscal autonomy is seen as desirable, Shanske (2014, 
p. 16) states that granting cities fiscal powers is not without risk:
The benefit principle requires that each city bear the entire cost of any poor fiscal deci-
sions made by that city, including any choices regarding borrowing. Such a rule is 
called a ‘hard budget constraint.’ Hard budget constraints compel local citizens to 
take full ownership of their local government because they bear the consequences of 
any local government failures.
In Australia, fiscal autonomy is an outcome, with decentralisation the process to 
achieving reform through sharing existing taxes and defining new taxes that would be the 
domain of metropolitan government. This objective is relevant for Australia, which, in 
addition to being a low-taxing country, has one of the most centralised tax systems within 
the OECD. Further, it is a country that has yet to embrace the concept of metropolitan 
government and how it should be funded.
Fiscal policy that drives decentralisation evokes debate and scrutiny, and is challenged 
by virtue of the way it is imposed and how revenue is collected, allocated and spent. There 
are disparate views on the objectives of fiscal policy and its impost in a modern and evolv-
ing user-pays economy. The Commonwealth of Australia (2014) expresses challenges con-
fronting government in achieving fiscal reform in the delivery of services and 
infrastructure. This chapter shows that countries with decentralised tax systems are more 
successfully able to raise taxes through lower tiers of government that are responsible for 
delivery of public goods and services.
The chapter commences with a review of the fiscal arrangements and reforms abroad, 
followed by the existing fiscal arrangements that have served Australia over the past 60 
years. It defines how policy has evolved and why it must further evolve. It paves the way for 
the development of a framework for reform and the case for metropolitan fiscal decentrali-
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sation in moving towards the goal of fiscal autonomy. The change needed to achieve this is 
driven by the decentralisation of existing tax-raising powers, as well as development of the 
tax effort of subnational government through new taxes.
It shows that reform will depend on cooperation between tiers of government, with the 
goals of more efficiently funding public goods and services. Defining which tier of govern-
ment is responsible for services, in particular, services for which hypothecated taxes may 
be imposed, is an important component of reform. Further, the practice of cost-shifting by 
higher to lower tiers of government without allocative means of funding is counterproduc-
tive; it requires corresponding fiscal decentralisation or new revenue sources to fund 
recurrent costs and capital expenditure.
Fiscal decentralisation: the pathway to increased autonomy
The way in which metropolitan areas are governed and funded affects the way in which 
service delivery is achieved across municipal areas, also known in Australia as local gov-
ernment areas. As cities continue to grow, Westman (2007, p. 87) defines the conceptual 
economic benefits of this growth as, ‘Urbanisation is one of the most powerful irreversible 
forces of the world … cities make countries rich. Countries that are highly urbanized have 
higher incomes, more stable economies and stronger institutions’.
What is not addressed to the same extent is the question of how fast-evolving metrop-
olises should be funded and, more specifically, how much autonomy administrators 
should have in raising own-source revenues. In both unitary and federated structures, the 
revenues of local government in meeting the needs of metropolitan areas lag behind the 
financial capacity of their geographic boundaries. The need for greater fiscal capacity 
coordinated across cities globally has never been greater, with the increasing diversity of 
cities and demand for infrastructure. Slack (2010, p. 8) emphasises the need for both ‘hard 
services, water transit and roads’ as well as ‘soft services such as cultural, libraries among 
other social services’.
In large cities, services that have traditionally been the role of upper tiers of subcentral 
government (SCG) have progressively been divested to local government. Increasingly, the 
need to bring essential services closer to the community has resulted in the growth of 
health, local policing and elementary educational services by lower tiers of government. In 
other cases, this has been achieved without the requisite forms of funding needed to sup-
port services.
The ability of a city to levy its own taxes and determine tax rates, results in more 
responsibility and accountability to its residents. However, ‘First should come the assign-
ment of expenditure responsibility to local government and then the assignment of reve-
nue responsibility should be determined’ (Bahl 1999, p.  7). The primary reason for 
decentralisation of fiscal revenue is defined by Musgrave (1983) as the wish to move gov-
ernment closer to the people, the efficiency gain that most economists agree to be the 
rationale. If we advocate for fiscal decentralisation, then we must believe that:
When preferences among voters are diverse and local government have responsibility 
for delivering those services that do not have major external effects, the potential ben-
efits include better public services, better accountability on the part of government 
officials, more willingness to pay for services and hopefully ‘development from below 
(Bahl 1999, p. 2).
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The ability of a city to determine its objectives is impacted by its self-determined reve-
nues compared with revenues generated through grant funding from higher tiers of gov-
ernment. Grants are one of the largest revenues sources of local government, either in the 
form of general-purpose grants or specific-purpose grants; the latter may result in higher 
tiers of government influencing how grant revenue is to be allocated and spent (Warren 
2004). Despite the sentiment towards fiscal autonomy and measures to decentralise fiscal 
revenue sources, central government transfers are in the top two sources of revenue for 
many cities: in London they comprise 74%, in Berlin 26%, in Madrid 37%, in New York 
31%, in Paris 18% and in Tokyo 8% (Slack and Cote 2014).
It is apt at this point to briefly define the differences between the two main structures 
of government in supporting the fiscal split between taxes shared by more than one tier of 
government. In distinguishing the fiscal powers of federated and unitary structures:
A unitary structure of government, or unitary state, is a sovereign state governed as a 
single entity. The central government is sole authority, and the administrative divi-
sions exercise only powers that the central government has delegated to them. Subdi-
visional units are created and abolished, and their powers may be broadened and 
narrowed by central government. Federated structures of governments include the 
USA, Canada and Australia, while England, New Zealand and Denmark are unitary 
structures (Mangioni 2016, p. 336).
In contrast to unitary states, under a federated structure, power is shared between fed-
eral and SCG tiers of government. The SCGs themselves are unitary in nature in their 
relationship and administration of local government or metropolitan government (Man-
gioni 2016). In a federation the component states are in some sense sovereign, insofar as 
certain powers are reserved to them that may not be exercised by central government 
(OECD 2009).
In industrial countries, the revenue split at subnational government is approximately 
one-third of total tax revenue collected (Bahl 1999). In contrast, in Australia the share is less 
than 20% and is unsustainable under the current collection ratio. In increasing this share, 
the questions best asked, are how decentralisation is to be achieved, how revenue should be 
decentralised and, given the low tax-take in Australia, how and which tier of government is 
best placed to recalibrate this revenue disparity. Australia is ideally fiscally placed to com-
mence decentralisation through the funding of a metropolitan structure of government.
Table 12.1 sets out the disparity of own-source revenue as a percentage of total tax 
between central and local government in unitary and federated structures. It shows that 
local government in Australia collects less than half the OECD average for federated coun-
tries, and one-third when compared with the USA and Canada. There are significant limi-
tations in the funding of local government in Australia, but there is also the opening for 
fiscal reforms to encompass potential opportunity for funding to be decentralised and allo-
cated to an evolving metropolitan government across Australia. In Table 12.1, the difference 
between the percentage of revenue collected by central and local government in federated 
structures is the revenue collected by the upper tier of SCG, defined as states or provinces.
We now examine the options for reforming fiscal sharing and restructuring the tiers of 
government, with metropolitan government in mind. This is followed by the review under-
taken in the progressive metropolitan development of Toronto and restructuring opera-
tional and fiscal arrangements in Denmark, which moved to a quasi-metropolitan/regional 
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government structure during the 1990/2000s. Each example highlights potential reforms 
of fiscal arrangements in Australia.
Fiscal reformation: sharing tax revenues by tiers of 
government
In defining the taxonomy of power between tiers of government, the OECD (2009, p. 4) 
incrementally distinguishes the levels of fiscal autonomy applied to SCG in the following 
broad categories:
 ● SCG sets tax rate without the need to consult a higher tier of government;
 ● SCG initially sets the tax rate, with higher tier of government setting upper or lower 
limits;
 ● a tax-sharing arrangement between SCG and central government, in which SCG 
determines the split;
 ● a tax-sharing arrangement between SCG and central government, with central 
government determining the split;
 ● a tax-sharing arrangement between SCG and central government, in which the split 
is set out in legislation,
 ● central government sets the rate and the base of the SCG tax or taxes.
A study of 17 OECD countries demonstrates the evolution of fiscal autonomy in Europe 
through own-source revenues shared between central government and SCG that embrace 
these options (Blochliger and King 2006). This study shows that 36% of revenue is col-
lected from highly mobile income taxes, 21% from consumption taxes and 19% from 
immobile property taxes. It is apparent that sharing the same tax base with cohesive agree-
ments between jurisdictions is progressively becoming a successful decentralisation option 
in European countries. While an option, many metropolitan areas including London are 
at different phases in the decentralisation process, with London’s primary source of reve-
nue after grants being the council tax, which accounts for 8–9% of its revenue.
While in principle tax-sharing arrangements appear to demonstrate a collaborative 
approach to bridging revenues across tiers of government, a more granular analysis is 
needed in determining their success at the operational level. In Australia, the sole tax 
imposed at the local government level is council rates, and even so the states increasingly 
govern the increase and amount of revenue that may be collected by local government. A 
Table 12.1. Tax collection percentage, central v. local government
Country Central Local Structure
Australia 80.0 3.5 Federation
Germany 31.2 8.2 Federation
USA 42.1 14.1 Federation
Canada 41.4 10.3 Federation
Federated OECD 
average
53.4 7.6
Denmark 75 25 Unitary
UK 75.8 5 Unitary
New Zealand 93.7 6.7 Unitary
Unitary OECD average 63.5 11.7
Source data: OECD (2016).
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similar regime exists in the UK in relation to the council tax. In these two countries, this 
tax is the only fiscal impost applied at the local level excluding user charges, yet increases 
in revenue from that source is regulated or determined by central government in London 
and state government in Australia.
The above study, referred to by Blochliger and King (2006), was primarily conducted 
on unitary countries, where revenue splits were more amicably agreed. The only source of 
tax revenue collected by local government in Australia and the UK results in their split of 
local revenue being among the lowest in the OECD. In the case of Australia, this will be 
addressed further in the following section. We now review two cases where fiscal reforms 
over the past decade have involved decentralisation and restructuring of the functions and 
fiscal responsibilities of government. The studies demonstrate that reforms may be 
achieved through incremental fiscal decentralisation as shown in Toronto, or in sweeping 
reforms in restructuring government as implemented in Denmark.
Metropolitan fiscal reform in Toronto
Canada is a federated structure with a central government, 10 provinces and three territo-
ries. As Canada federated, central government allowed its provinces to retain the right to 
impose similar tax bases but it has adopted varying degrees of disincentives in attempting 
to minimise tax competition across its provinces. With a highly urbanised population, 
among the latest raft of tax reforms is the funding and revenue sources collected by Cana-
da’s cities. In taking steps to building fiscal autonomy through decentralisation in Toronto, 
the City of Toronto Act was introduced in 2006.
Toronto is the largest (most populous) city of Canada, with 6 242 300 residents (Statis-
tics Canada 2016). The objectives of the City of Toronto Act are to provide a level of metro-
politan self-governance and financial capacity in meeting the specific needs of the city. 
The objectives of the Act are set out under Part 1 – Interpretation of the Act. These high-
light the need to balance province and city interests; points 6 and 7 focus on the need to 
meet the city’s fiscal objectives:
The purpose of this Act is to create a framework of broad powers for the City which 
balances the interests of the Province and the City and which recognizes that the City 
must be able to do the following things in order to provide good government:
1. Determine what is in the public interest for the City.
2. Respond to the needs of the City.
3. Determine the appropriate structure for governing the City.
4. Ensure that the City is accountable to the public and that the process for making 
decisions is transparent.
5. Determine the appropriate mechanisms for delivering municipal services in the 
City.
6. Determine the appropriate levels of municipal spending and municipal taxation 
for the City.
7. Use fiscal tools to support the activities of the City. 2006, c. 11, Sched. A, s. 2.
The City of Toronto has a relatively narrow but expanding tax base, primarily derived 
from recurrent property taxation (50% of revenue), followed by municipal land transfer tax 
(7%) and a third-party sign tax (0.1%). The signage tax is a potential revenue source for 
Australia’s cities. The balance of Toronto’s revenues is derived from user fees, which 
account for 43% of revenue (City of Toronto 2016). That review of revenues collected by the 
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 $
{D
at
e}
. $
{P
ub
lis
he
r}
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
Australia’s Metropolitan Imperative180
City of Toronto defined further tax sources that would assist in funding the city until 2021. 
Two additional tax options are available – a personal vehicle tax and an alcohol beverage 
tax. The latter requires provincial regulatory changes before it can be enacted.
Significantly higher revenue may be collected through the recently introduced third-
party sign tax (City of Toronto 2016). This tax has been a solid revenue source in interna-
tional cities including New York and Tokyo under the enterprise tax. Further tax reforms 
under review require provincial support for introduction as metropolitan taxes; they 
include hotel, municipal income and municipal sales taxes. The City of Toronto has dele-
gated power under its governing Act to establish budgets and to operate many of its ser-
vices through boards, agencies and corporations, some of which facilitate user or fee-related 
charges. There are over 30 instrumentalities in operation across Toronto City, including 
policing, public health and transit commissions. The key objectives of these instrumentali-
ties as defined by the City of Toronto (2016) are to:
 ● meet legal requirements;
 ● operate in a commercial environment;
 ● focus on delivering a specific policy objective or service;
 ● enable independent decision-making;
 ● engage citizens in board decision-making, bring expertise, involve funders or 
fundraisers and use volunteer capacity.
Fiscal reformation in Denmark
The Danish local government reform comprises three reform elements – a territorial 
reform (merging of municipalities), a reallocation of tasks across levels of government, and 
a financing and equalisation system of reform. This allows compensating costs and bene-
fits to carry over from one reform element to the other (Jenson and Jacobson 2009). The 
municipal reform was presented by the government as a solution for reinforcing decen-
tralisation, both functionally and fiscally.
Until 1970 Denmark consisted of 1389 urban and rural municipalities, which were 
amalgamated into 275 municipalities. The 24 counties were merged into 14. In 2007 a fur-
ther wave of reform was implemented by central government. It abolished the counties, 
replacing them with five regions and merging the 275 municipalities into 98. The restruc-
turing of subnational government as of 1 January 2007 resulted in two levels of govern-
ment: level 1 the state (central) government and level 2 comprising regions and 
municipalities. There is no subordination between regional and municipal government as 
they have different tasks and responsibilities (Local Government Denmark 2009).
One of the main elements of the Danish reform was the increase of power and funding 
at the local and metropolitan levels which resulted from the dissolution of the county level. 
Several tasks were transferred from the counties, leaving the municipalities responsible for 
handling most welfare tasks including compulsory education and special education for 
adults, rehabilitation and long-term care for the elderly, preventive health care, nature and 
environmental planning, participation in regional transport companies and maintenance 
of the local road network (Blöchliger and Vammalle 2012).
The number of taxation levels was reduced from three to two, since the regions, unlike 
the counties, no longer had the authority to impose taxes. The revenues of regional govern-
ment consist of block grants and activity-based funding from the central government and 
local government (Falk-Rasmussen and Muller 2010). In addition, local government reform 
does not result in changes in the distribution of the cost burden between the municipali-
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ties. A reform of the grant and equalisation system was carried out, which takes into 
account the new distribution of tasks (Blöchliger and Vammalle 2012).
In terms of the total cost of public services and their allocation across government 
levels, the reform was conceived as a zero-sum game, on the principle that ‘the funds follow 
the tasks’. Apart from one-off transition costs, the reform was neutral with respect to the 
overall spending of the central and subcentral levels. In addressing cost-shifting higher 
grants; on the one hand, municipalities receive new grants from the central government 
for the services transferred to them and, on the other hand, the newly created regions have 
no taxing power and are funded by grants from the central government and the munici-
palities (Blöchliger and Vammalle 2012).
At the municipality level, the tax revenue collection is spread across several sources, of 
which income tax comprises the largest portion at ~70% (Falk-Rasmussen and Muller 
2010). User payment charges and fees are the second largest source at 10%, with property 
tax the third largest income source at 8%. Grants from central government account for 7%, 
with the rest of the tax revenue derived from loans, company tax and interest (Local Gov-
ernment Denmark 2009).
Case for fiscal decentralisation in Australia
The Toronto and Danish reforms assist in conceptualising the construct of metropolitan 
government in Australia. While it is useful to make international comparisons of fiscal 
policy and arrangements between the various tiers of government, it would be remiss not 
to acknowledge that each system has been shaped by the jurisdiction’s political, economic, 
demographic and temporal circumstances. With this in mind, some of the evolving inter-
national reforms inspire the opportunity to decentralise fiscal control and further develop 
own-source revenues at the metropolitan level in Australia. In this section we examine 
Australia’s tax system, the need for decentralisation and the recommendations of Austral-
ia’s major tax reviews of the past 40 years. This provides the foundation for the case to fund 
services at the metropolitan level and addresses corresponding capital outlays now defined 
as infrastructure development.
It was shown above (in Table 12.1) that Australia has one of the most centralised tax sys-
tems in the world, with local government own-source revenue accounting for little more 
than 3% of total tax revenue collected across all three tiers of government. Two further 
observations are made about Australia’s taxes: the overall tax collected in Australia is well 
below the OECD average, and the tax mix varies across the broad tax categories. In sum-
mary, consumption taxes are below the OECD average as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), while income taxes are above the average. This brings to the fore, the need 
to reform the tax mix as well as the overall tax effort in Australia, while improving fiscal 
revenues that are generated at the local and potentially at the metropolitan level.
To put these points into context, we examine the evolution of Australia’s taxes since 
Federation, the role of the Grants Commission and the key tax reforms of the past four 
decades that have shaped the dominance of central government as Australia’s fiscal gate-
keeper. This provides a background for the fiscal decentralisation discussion that follows.
Australia’s fiscal evolution post-Federation
The stability of the Australian Federation has been tested since its creation: in 1933 there 
was a Western Australian referendum on secession, which resulted in 68% of voters opting 
for that state to leave the Commonwealth. This action was prompted by the financial and 
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fiscal circumstances that impacted Western Australia, and prompted the creation of the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission. One of the Commission’s first tasks was to develop 
equalisation of centrally collected revenue for allocation to the smaller populous states of 
Australia. The initiative to secede was not actioned by Western Australia, but it empha-
sised the impact of Australia’s fiscal federalism on the states close to a century ago.
The challenge of fiscal federalism was again emphasised in the early 1940s, when the 
Commonwealth took control of income and company taxes from the states under the Uni-
form Taxation Act 1942, to fund the war effort. The Commonwealth placed conditions on 
the states’ reimbursement grants, which resulted in a High Court challenge by the states, a 
challenge that was won by the Commonwealth. While the states were still able to impose 
incomes taxes, the Commonwealth had the power to offset grant revenue corresponding to 
the amount of income tax collected by the states (Warren 2004).
The rationale for the primary function of the Commonwealth Grants Commission is 
the equalisation of fiscal revenues across the states:
State governments should receive funding from the Commonwealth such that, if each 
made the same effort to raise revenue from its own sources and operated at the same 
level of efficiency, each would have the capacity to provide services at the same stand-
ard (Commonwealth of Australia 2009).
While an important mechanism in achieving this objective, in Canada and Germany 
equalisation is tempered to increase the efficiency of provinces and lander (the equivalent 
mid-tier of government) and to stimulate growth in more dependent jurisdictions. It is 
recognised by the Commonwealth Grants Commission that the current formula used to 
distribute revenue, may reduce the incentive for states to promote economic growth and 
development. This is the catalyst to consider alternative options and sources of revenue 
that may be imposed by subnational government, through encouragement and incentives 
from the Commonwealth.
It is clear that the Commonwealth Grants Commission has a role to play in equalising 
centrally collected revenues across disparate regions of Australia. This chapter also argues 
that it has a role in incentivising the sharing of centrally collected revenues and the evolu-
tion of own-source revenues at the local and metropolitan levels of the Australian Federa-
tion. In essence, its charter needs to progress to incentivise and support the fiscal 
development of metropolitan government.
Tax reforms after the Asprey and Henry reviews
The 1980s were an important period of fiscal reform resulting from the Asprey Review of 
Australia’s tax system a decade earlier. The high rates applied to income tax became a dis-
incentive for employees in higher tax brackets in excess of 60c/$. The review canvassed the 
need for a consumption tax, which took a quarter of a century to introduce. The revenue 
from consumption was to replace income tax revenues resulting from the progressive 
reductions in income tax revenue.
However as in most tax reviews, time passes before recommendations are adopted, 
with many reforms adopted out of necessity. Hewson (2014, p. 591) highlights that the time 
between review and reform of fiscal policy is gradual and progressive, with key reforms 
taking up to 20 years to implement:
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Asprey’s recommendations received little attention from the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments … the issues it raised did not disappear. Indeed, the major reforms of 
the 1980s – capital gains tax, fringe benefits tax, dividend imputation, large cuts to 
personal and business income tax rates – the taxation of foreign-sourced income in 
1990, and a broad-based consumption tax in 1998, were all stimulated by Asprey. 
They sought to broaden the base and, to the extent possible, cut the statutory rates 
of tax.
In the absence of a much-needed consumption tax, in 1985 the Commonwealth intro-
duced a capital gains tax, which replaced revenue resulting from the progressive reduc-
tions in income tax and company tax rates. The capital gains tax was introduced with one 
significant carve-out, i.e. the principal place of residence. This was one major asset class 
that central government could not build a compelling rationale to tax. In 1992 a retirement 
levy in the form of mandated superannuation, known as the superannuation guarantee 
charge (SGC), was introduced with the long-term view of reducing the redistribution of 
tax revenue through aged pensions in the decades ahead.
A goods and services tax commenced in 2000 and was one of the most important 
reforms of the 21st century – Australia formally introduced a consumption tax. This 
reform was tax re-centralisation as it replaced many of the wholesale sales taxes that were 
fractured into subcategories according to the goods to which the tax was applied. While 
these are important reforms, they were mandated by central government in Australia, 
which collects and controls over 80% of tax revenue. There has been less fiscal reform at 
the subnational level of government. Between 1976 and 1981 the states progressively abol-
ished death duties. The lost revenue from inter-generational wealth transfers through will-
ing of assets, including the family home, was replaced with increases in stamp duty over 
the same period.
In stark contrast to the increases in stamp duty on property since the Asprey Review, 
the recommendations of the 2010 Henry Review addressed the reforms needed to increase 
revenues by subnational government. Key among them were recommendations to expand 
state land tax to include the family home, which is the single largest expenditure of this 
tax. Figure 12.1 shows that recurrent land tax collected from the combination of state land 
tax and local government rating is the fourth largest source of revenue in Australia, yield-
ing marginally more revenue than payroll tax, which is the fifth largest revenue source.
The 10 taxes shown in Fig. 12.1 account for ~90% of total tax revenue in Australia. The 
remaining 10% of tax revenue is derived from 115 different taxes. Figure 12.1 also shows 
that the top three tax revenue sources are collected by central government, none of them 
shared with SCG. Income tax is the largest source of tax revenue in Australia, and is above 
the OECD average. The importance of maintaining competitive labour taxes moves the 
tax pendulum towards increasing taxes on consumption and capital. This raises questions 
as to how Australia’s tax system may be reformed in building fiscal capacity, deriving tax 
revenues that would fund metropolitan government and sharing existing tax sources with 
central government.
The previous section showed that most fiscal reforms over the past five decades were 
driven by central government as the primary tax collection tier of government. We now 
consider several potential fiscal measures for funding a metropolitan structure across the 
cities and emerging urban agglomerations of Australia. These measures are categorised 
into the groupings of expanding existing fiscal sources, inter-governmental sharing of 
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similar tax bases, and the proposed introduction of new taxes that would be the sole 
domain of a metropolitan government.
The mix of options indicates that there is no single answer for tax reform and funding 
of any one tier of government. This is supported by the variety of taxes that operate at the 
metropolitan and local levels internationally. What emerges in Australia, resulting from 
the challenges of fiscal federalism, is the low level of total tax revenue collected and the 
limited tax mix from which revenue is derived. These factors precipitate the need for fiscal 
evolution and new substantial tax revenue sources, in which Australia’s cities are impor-
tant facilitators in driving tax reform.
Table 12.2 demonstrates the need for fiscal reform through decentralisation at the met-
ropolitan level in Australia. Pertinent is the narrow revenue imposts by local government 
in Australia in contrast to the evolved revenues collected in New York and Toronto (both 
federations) and Tokyo and Paris (unitary structures). The residence tax in Paris and prop-
erty tax in New York and Toronto are significantly higher than the revenue collected from 
this tax in the cities of Australia. This is due to restrictive rate-pegging and capping 
imposed on local government by the states – the exact opposite to the revenue-sharing 
opportunities that should exist in Australia.
Further noted in Table 12.2 are automobile and vehicle taxes imposed in Tokyo and 
soon to be imposed in Toronto. The largest capital expense of local and potentially metro-
politan government is road maintenance and capital works. This revenue is easily hypoth-
ecated to roads and transport by local or metropolitan government and would replace the 
Roads to Recovery funding granted by the Commonwealth directly to many local govern-
ment areas in the capital cities of Australia. While this revenue would remain important 
financial assistance for many regional local government areas, its equivalence at a metro-
politan level would be best funded through an automobile impost.
Table 12.2 shows many of the opportunities for funding goods and services that are 
successfully applied in metropolises internationally. It demonstrates how cities may con-
tribute to expanding tax revenue and the fiscal reform agenda in Australia. In the next 
sections we elaborate on the direction of reform, through new revenues that may be intro-
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Fig. 12.1. Sources of tax revenue in Australia. Source data: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016)
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duced and the expansion of existing revenues through sharing of the tax base across tiers 
of government in Australia.
Defining the objectives and rationale for funding 
metropolitan government
It was pointed out earlier in this chapter, that tax revenues and funding by higher tiers of 
government should follow the tasks and responsibilities of government. In contextualising 
fiscal priorities, Tomlinson (2016) defines two significant points that would be the domain 
of metropolitan government, i.e. subsidiarity of infrastructure services (stated as best pro-
vided at the metropolitan level) and devolution of responsibility for funding such projects. 
In the capital cities of Australia, addressing housing and the transport mobility of rapidly 
expanding populations requires fiscal measures at the metropolitan coalface. The primary 
focus of this section is the initial and recurrent funding needed to develop and maintain 
new and regenerated infrastructure across metropolitan locations, although some opera-
tional responsibilities may be shared across tiers of government.
Several options exist for expanding and creating alternative sources of revenue that are 
well-defined as the domain of metropolitan government. The first source is income tax 
revenue forgone by the Commonwealth on property that benefits from increases in value 
generated from public services and infrastructure. The second source is land tax revenue 
forgone by the states in the form of tax expended through the land tax threshold and the 
principal place of residence exemption (Mangioni 2016). The latter revenue source was the 
subject of review by Commonwealth of Australia (2008) and is still working its way 
through the current tax reforms needed at the subcentral level.
A further revenue source under review is that of value capture taxation generated by 
the uplift in value through the announcement and delivery of infrastructure. We now dis-
cuss each of these taxes and why they would apply at the metropolitan government level as 
a key source of revenue. It is demonstrated that fiscal decentralisation and sharing of tax 
bases across existing and new tiers of government is a progressive means of developing the 
taxonomy of power from revenue sources that are undertaxed in Australia. In summary, 
these tax sources are untapped by central government as it is nearly impossible to impose 
and collect them as consolidated revenue. The potential success of their introduction is 
against visible public goods and services that contribute to the value of the source from 
which the tax is collected.
Income and property or land taxes are the two senior revenue sources for metropolitan 
government that would be shared with central or state government in Australia. Neither 
tax is imposed by either of those tiers in the form they would be imposed by metropolitan 
government. The Henry (2008) and Asprey (1975) reviews both defined the need for SCG 
to increase sources of revenue and improve overall tax effort, while reforming inefficient 
taxes that contributed to social deadweight loss. We examine these two taxes and why they 
are suited to metropolitan government, and briefly canvass two additional taxes.
While central government collects higher percentages of tax revenues and grant some 
to lower tiers of government, much of this revenue is far less visible to the taxpayer. That is, 
consumption taxes that are subsumed into the cost of goods and services are spent on 
much of the visual goods used by the community, which includes public infrastructure. 
This does not necessarily mean that revenue is being misallocated, but that it may be better 
matched against the goods and services it is allocated to. Most of the tax revenue collected 
by central government is near-invisible to taxpayers, as employers collect and remit income 
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taxes and businesses remit revenues collected from goods and services consumption taxes 
(Mangioni 2016).
Fiscal decentralisation: shared tax bases
Metropolitan land tax
In comparison to the federations of Canada and the USA, Australia collects approximately 
one-third of revenue from recurrent land tax, known as the property tax. Similarly, in con-
trast to New Zealand, Australia collects ~65% of the revenue that New Zealand collects 
from this tax as a percentage of GDP, and collects less than half the revenue of that tax in 
the UK. While debate has recently centred on constitutional recognition of local govern-
ment, the greater imperative should be directed at managing the limitations that the states 
impose on local government revenue-raising capacity from council rating. At present the 
states are unable to evolve and reform their own recurrent land tax due to its visibility, 
while revenue from this source at the local government level varies significantly across 
capital cities.
The first reform to be addressed should be the uniform abolition of the land tax thresh-
old in each capital city of Australia (Mangioni 2016, pp. 236–237). This revenue would be 
collected by metropolitan government through a system similar to the local government 
rating system. The second land tax source for metropolitan government would be a recur-
rent land tax on the principal place of residence in the capital cities. Mangioni (2016) dis-
cusses that fact that council rates in Australia are on average one-third of the same tax in 
the USA and Canada. This source of revenue cannot be readily captured as a consolidated 
revenue tax by the states as it cannot be clearly tied to any particular expenditure.
A progressive phase-in of this tax over a five-year period as metropolitan government 
evolves, would provide an important revenue source on which the states are unable to capi-
talise. In Table 12.2, this revenue is earmarked for capital expenditure on utilities. The tax 
could also be spread across capital outlay earmarked for transport infrastructure.
Metropolitan land gain tax
Close to a decade after the Asprey tax review, capital gains tax was formalised as a subset 
of income tax under the provisions of the Income Tax and Assessment Tax 1936. The gov-
ernment of the day, in maintaining the competitiveness of income tax, formalised the 
income capital gains tax, i.e. income from gains generated from increases in unearned 
increments of value. But the principal place of residence has largely remained exempt. A 
land gain tax, specifically derived from revenue forgone by the Commonwealth from capi-
tal gains on residential property, is an important fiscal void that would be filled by metro-
politan government.
Similar to land tax, this would be a visible tax remitted directly by the taxpayer on their 
single largest source of wealth and investment. The residence does not generate cash-flow 
income, the primary return on investment is the capital growth. This source of revenue, if 
imposed by central government, would not likely be acceptable as a consolidated revenue tax 
source. It is, however, ripe for impost by metropolitan government which would earmark the 
revenue for capital expenditure of infrastructure projects, both new and regenerated. The 
introduction of this tax by central government in 1985 was the first step in taxing capital 
value. The second phase of implementing this tax at the metropolitan level in Australia needs 
to be supported by central government and the upper tiers of SCG. The reality is that this is 
not a revenue source that these higher tiers of government could successfully impose.
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Decentralisation: new tax bases
Value capture taxation
The sourcing of metropolitan revenue through value capture taxation takes several forms, 
which include tax increment financing and betterment taxation and levies. These are not 
new concepts but have made a resurgence over the past decade and are used to partially 
fund several national and international projects. Locally, these projects include the Gold 
Coast Light Rail and Melbourne City Loop, while internationally value capture has been 
successful in partially funding the London Cross rail, New York Hudson Yards Rail Pro-
ject and Hong Kong Rail and Property Development. This form of financing may contrib-
ute up to 30% of the project cost. It is usually levied incrementally on the surrounding 
property that benefits from the project, separately from user charges which are levied to 
use the infrastructure.
Value capture taxes, unlike land tax, are hypothecated imposts specifically earmarked for 
defined projects, but the rationales for the impost and allocation of funds are not always 
clearly understood by taxpayers. In the broader scheme of these projects, the impost would 
be best aligned with metropolitan government which would deliver such projects in conjunc-
tion with the private sector through private–public partnerships in co-funding projects.
Signage tax
Signage and billboard taxes are established revenue sources in the largest cities of the 
world, including Tokyo, New York and Toronto. They are generally classified as enterprise 
taxes and the revenue collected from this source is not usually defined as a benefits-
received tax, but as consolidated revenue unless specifically defined. This is a potential 
revenue source for Australian cities, particularly in the central business districts and high-
profile transport corridors, where private land, stratum and government land is used and 
leased for advertising purposes.
Review of equalisation and reform incentives
Equalisation remains an important mechanism in federated and unitary structures of gov-
ernment internationally, particularly following the global financial crisis, where regional 
Australia was doubly impacted by the coinciding end of the commodities boom. Equalisa-
tion may be used to target support through the incentivised fiscal reforms of subcentral 
and metropolitan government. In contrast to granting excess revenue, expanding alloca-
tion through co-funding projects at the metropolitan level would transition to more fiscal 
independence at the metropolitan level.
In metropolitan locations where central government revenues exceed expenditure, the 
option exists for central government to support the impost of metropolitan taxes and 
levies. These imposts may be assessed on the value of land and collected by metropolitan 
government for infrastructure projects. In addition to revenue collected by metropolitan 
government, the Commonwealth (through the Grants Commission) would initially 
directly subsidise metropolitan government for metropolitan revenue raised and spent on 
earmarked projects. This would commence fiscal decentralisation and build a pathway for 
metropolitan government to progressively become fiscally independent.
Table 12.3 sets out the potential taxes identified for impost by metropolitan govern-
ment and the inter-governmental arrangements that could be applied for sharing the 
exempt portions of the tax forgone by central government. The responsibilities and 
expense classification are aligned with the potential revenues that are best suited to this 
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tier of government. This match is determined by the tax category, particularly in the case 
of consolidated revenue where the goods and services benefit the community and the 
value of property from which the revenue is derived. In the case of metropolitan trans-
port, for example, the initial capital outlay is derived from revenues generated from 
increases in the value of land that has resulted or will result from the capital works. This 
fits within the consolidated revenue category, as revenue is initially collected in the lead-
up to the commencement of the works. 
As a way of incentivising metropolitan government in developing fiscal capacity, the 
revenue that is traditionally passed down through block grants would be targeted as co-
incentive payments made for the delivery of metropolitan goods and services. This co-
funding is defined as an equalisation transition incentive scheme, as shown in Table 12.3, 
and is a more efficient and targeted strategy than are block grants. In Australia, central 
government tax revenues forgone in the form of capital gains are a potentially important 
source of revenue for local and metropolitan government in paying for goods and services 
within defined locations.
Conclusion
This chapter supports the idea that the ongoing urbanisation of Australia’s cities necessi-
tates the reform of fiscal policy, to recognise and fund metropolitan governments in bring-
ing services closer to the communities they serve. This reform includes sharing existing 
tax bases that have traditionally been the domain of central government, and supports the 
introduction of new tax sources. An international review of revenues collected by local and 
metropolitan government shows that several new taxes should be supported by govern-
ment at the metropolitan level in Australia. The approach of fiscal decentralisation would 
be more acceptable to taxpayers where taxes are imposed at the local or metropolitan level 
of government.
In supporting a metropolitan government structure, a clearer distinction is needed in 
defining the roles and functions of SCG. International examples show that metropolitan 
government roles must be clearly defined across local and state government, particularly 
in federated structures. In federated structures, lower tiers of government are not as well-
resourced as those in unitary structures. In unitary structures there is clearer distinction 
Table 12.3. Fiscal responsibility and tax assignment of metropolitan government
Metropolitan 
responsibility
Expense 
classification Metropolitan tax Tax category
Metropolitan 
transport (roadways, 
tunnels and light rail)
Capital outlay Value capture
Land taxes
Capital gains tax
Consolidated/benefits 
received revenue
Recurrent 
maintenance and 
expenditure
Automobile tax
User charges
Benefits received
Hard (utility) services Capital outlay Land tax Consolidated revenue
Recurrent 
expenditure
User utility 
charges
Benefits received
Environmental and 
waste management
Billboard tax Consolidated/benefits 
received
Equalisation transition incentive scheme
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of fiscal responsibility; in Denmark, fiscal capacity was devolved to local government. Its 
capital cities have evolved to become metropolitan in raising revenue and the assignment 
of responsibility. Similarly, the City of Toronto has begun sharing taxes with the provinces 
and central government.
The review of Australia’s taxes shows options for local or metropolitan government to 
share existing tax bases. It further shows that these imposts would be more acceptable to 
taxpayers when hypothecated against local goods and services, which in turn contribute to 
the value of the land the imposts are raised against. In achieving progressive fiscal decen-
tralisation, the ability to bring metropolitan goods and services, particularly infrastruc-
ture, closer to the community, will result in the ability of SCG to contribute to increasing 
overall tax revenue.
To engender fiscal autonomous reform, central government, in contrast to granting 
consolidated revenue to lower tiers of government, should reorient its role in partnering 
with metropolitan government. As the objective of fiscal decentralisation is progressively 
achieved, greater autonomy responsibility and accountability will transfer to local and 
metropolitan government. In federated countries where significant tax revenue is expended 
in the tax base of central and upper SCG, metropolitan government is well-positioned in 
imposing and collecting revenues from the sources discussed in this chapter. In modernis-
ing the tax system in Australia, fiscal recognition through decentralisation of taxes to local 
and metropolitan government is a priority in addressing the needs of Australians.
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